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Abstract 
The omission effect, first described by Spranca et al. (1991), has been extensively studied 
in the proceeding decades and repeatedly confirmed (Cushman et al., 2012). Accordingly, 
all else being equal, most people judge it to be morally worse to actively bring about a 
negative effect than to passively allow that effect to happen. In this paper, we provide new 
experimental data challenging previous studies on the omission effect, both 
methodologically and philosophically. We argue that those studies have failed to control 
for the equivalence of rules that get violated by actions and omissions. Once equivalent 
norms are introduced, our results show that the omission effect is eliminated even if the 
negative outcome of the behavior is foreseen and intended by the agent. We will show 
that the omission effect does not constitute a basic moral disposition but occurs rather 
exclusively in more complex moral situations. Building on these empirical results, we put 
into doubt two influential explanations of the omission effect – the Causal Relevance 
Hypothesis and the Overgeneralization Hypothesis – and provide a novel explanation. 
Furthermore, we discuss various ramifications for the interplay between our 
understanding of omissions and legal systems. 
  
 - 3 - 
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Introducing the Omission Effect 
Is it morally worse to poison someone compared to not warning someone who is about to 
eat poisoned food? If you think it is, you are in good company. Many philosophers (Foot, 
1985; Moore, 2010; Quinn, 1989) have even argued for the more general claim that it is 
always morally worse to actively harm someone than to passively allow such harm to 
occur, a claim known as the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. This doctrine seems to 
reflect the intuitions of many laypeople. In an empirical study, Spranca et al. (1991) 
directly tested people’s responses to scenarios that described morally condemnable 
actions and omissions: In order to win the final, tennis player John West intends to poison 
Ivan Lendl during dinner the night before the match, by making sure Ivan eats the salad 
dressing he is allergic to. The alternative endings of the story vary only in regards to 
whether John actively recommends the poisonous dressing or allows Ivan to eat the 
poisonous dressing (in the case in which Ivan himself chooses the dressing he is allergic 
to). Spranca et al. (1991) found that even though in both scenarios John’s behavior is 
condemned, actively recommending the house dressing is considered morally worse than 
failing to warn Ivan. This asymmetry between actions and omissions has since been called 
omission bias (Ritov and Baron, 1999; Spranca et al., 1991) or omission effect (Cushman 
et al., 2012).1 Accordingly, many people judge omissions less harshly than actions, and 
even prefer omissions with a bad outcome over actions with a lower amount of the same 
bad outcome (Cushman et al., 2006; Ritov and Baron, 1999; Spranca et al., 1991). 
                                                 
1 In this paper we refer to it as 'omission effect' rather than 'omission bias'. We prefer to stay neutral on 
whether the omission effect is in fact a bias or reflects a reasonable principle that helps distinguish between 
different kinds of behaviour. 
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Not only do people show such an omission effect in controlled experiments, most legal 
systems issue more severe punishments for committing rather than omitting an action 
even if all other factors seem to be the same.2 The current debate on euthanasia provides 
an interesting case at hand. Whereas many countries allow for passive euthanasia, active 
euthanasia is prohibited in most countries – notable exceptions include Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the State of Oregon. The US Supreme Court stated 
that the “distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die is important, 
logical, rational, and well established: It comports with fundamental legal principles of 
causation, and intent; and has been widely recognized and endorsed in the medical 
profession, the state courts, and the overwhelming majority of state legislatures, which, 
like New York's, have permitted the former while prohibiting the latter.“ (Vacco v. Quill, 
1997). Thus, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is a philosophical distinction that seems 
to accurately map folk intuitions as well as some fundamental principles in codes of law. 
However, several philosophers have raised serious concerns about the moral relevance of 
this distinction. Jonathan Bennett for instance claims that such a distinction does not draw 
any morally significant line, but rather creates a “complex, shallow mess” (Bennett, 2011, 
68). According to Bennett, what really matters is the change in likelihood that a certain 
event occurs given the agent’s behavior. Raising the probability of a bad outcome is 
morally impermissible, irrespective of whether the probability was raised by committing 
or omitting an action. 
Peter Singer (2011) also challenges the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing by adopting a 
utilitarian point of view. He argues that under certain conditions it is even worse to let 
                                                 
2 This difference is particularly striking in American law, in which omissions are punishable in a very 
limited set of cases. 
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someone die than to kill that person, whereby the debate about euthanasia provides one 
of the most striking examples. Consider the case of Baby Doe, an infant born with Down’s 
syndrome and additional severe disabilities, which gained much attention in the 1980s. 
Baby Doe was born with serious disfigurement of his gullet that made it impossible for 
him to eat. After long deliberation his parents decided against surgery. After five days, 
Baby Doe died of dehydration and starvation. While this form of passive euthanasia was 
a legal course for his parents to take, administering a lethal injection was not. Singer 
claims: “The death resulting from the failure to operate in these circumstances is neither 
swift nor painless. […] To 'allow nature to take its course', withholding treatment but 
refusing to kill, would obviously be wrong.” (2011, 186).3  
1.2 Explaining the Omission Effect 
In this paper, we shall not address the normative question of whether the Doctrine of 
Doing and Allowing is a desirable or even justifiable moral principle. Instead, we will 
investigate if and when people believe that actions are indeed worse than omissions when 
the same outcome occurs. Although several explanations have been offered to account 
for the omission effect stated above, we will focus in this essay on two of the most 
interesting and influential theories.  
First, Spranca et al. (1991) found that many people explain differences in their moral 
judgments by a difference in the causal status of actions and omissions – call this the 
Causal Relevance Hypothesis. Several participants in Spranca et al.’s study reported that 
the agent’s action was causally more relevant to the outcome than the omission, for not 
                                                 
3 While Singer makes a compelling argument in this specific case, it should be noted, however, that Singer 
compares two situations in which one outcome is radically different from the other: death with little pain 
vs. death with a lot of pain. Many people will not be surprised that certain legal principles lose some of 
their force if the consequences vary as strongly between two options as in the case of Baby Doe. 
 - 6 - 
 
intervening simply means to let nature take its course. Cushman & Young also propose 
“that the action»omission distinction affects moral judgment principally via causal 
attribution” (Cushman & Young, 2011, 1069), whereas intentions and the outcome’s 
severity play a subordinate role. The results of both studies seem to provide some 
evidence that the agent’s causal relevance for the outcome triggers different moral 
evaluations. However, the direction of influence between causal and blame attributions is 
far from clear: Although their accounts differ in important respects, both Knobe and 
Fraser (2008) as well as Alicke (2008) argue that causal judgements are strongly 
influenced by moral judgements. Thus, when a subject conceives of another person’s 
behavior as morally blameworthy, then this is likely to also increase its perceived causal 
relevance. It is therefore at least controversial to identify causal attributions as the 
possible source of the omission effect.  
A second explanation has been suggested by Ritov & Baron (1999) among others. Ritov 
and Baron argue that it can hardly be denied that actions are usually morally worse than 
omissions: Omissions often correlate with lesser amounts of malicious intent, the desired 
outcome of omissions is less certain, etc. According to the Overgeneralization 
Hypothesis, when subjects judge the two endings of the tennis story differently, they 
overgeneralize from other cases and overlook that all morally relevant factors are 
identical. So while in many situations it is adequate to judge omissions less harshly than 
actions, people tend to wrongly apply this heuristic to cases in which there is in fact no 
morally significant difference. It has so far proven difficult, however, to provide 
conclusive evidence that the overgeneralization bias in fact exists. Several studies have 
not revealed an omission effect (Connolly and Reb, 2003; Mandel and Vartanian, 2007; 
Patt and Zeckhauser, 2000), and most studies, including Spranca’s original study, show 
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that a substantial number of subjects judged omissions just as bad as actions. So far, we 
don’t seem to have a principled explanation of why many studies reliably replicate the 
omission effect, while others do not.4 In any case, the results we present in this study will 
be of immediate relevance to the Causal Relevance Hypothesis as well as the 
Overgeneralization Hypothesis. 
1.3 The Importance of Controlling for the Equivalence of Norms 
While several methodological difficulties are usually carefully avoided, we believe that 
one crucial methodological problem has been severely neglected so far – nor has it been 
addressed in empirical work: None of the studies known to us has controlled for the 
equivalence of the norms used in vignettes, i.e. norms that are equally strong and use the 
same linguistic notions in both action and omission cases. While it has recently been 
pointed out that “[s]ocial perceivers may distinguish omissions and commissions by the 
norms these two actions violate“ (Malle et al., 2014, 168), researchers have allowed that 
within their studies, actions and omissions quite obviously violate non-equivalent rules. 
In order to ensure that the violated rules or norms are likely to be of equal strength and 
hence allow for comparability, we believe it important to adhere to two principles: 
1. Make rules explicit. 
2. Formulate rules as opposites / negations of each other. 
Most studies clearly fail to make the violated rules explicit in their vignettes, hence 
breaching the first principle. In Spranca’s scenarios, John West either recommends the 
house dressing that Lendl is allergic to, or fails to warn Lendl about the dressing. 
                                                 
4 Abarbanell and Hauser (2010) have correctly pointed out, that the design of the experiments differed 
significantly between studies. This makes it even harder to draw any general conclusions regarding the 
origin of the omission effect. 
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However, it is unclear which rules actually get violated in those scenarios: is it a case of 
poisoning, or cheating, a matter of violating the rule of sportsmanship, or a case of 
breaching a very general code of ethics, or all of them? Without specifying the rules that 
get violated, subjects’ thoughts are free to home in on any norm they see fit. However, 
different offences are known to receive very different punishments in legal systems. In 
other words, our preconceptions of the severity of offences might strongly influence our 
evaluations of people’s actions and omissions if we fail to explicate the rules that get 
violated.  
The second principle states that in order to compare the impact of actions and omissions 
on people’s reasoning, rules should be formulated in terms of opposites using the same 
linguistic notions. We know of no study that has tried to ensure that people are not 
influenced by the differences in the wording of the vignettes. Instead, people compare 
scenarios that are clearly not equivalent, e.g. cases of killing vs. letting die. The wording 
of this dichotomy already indicates a substantial difference in meaning. Unfortunately, 
most empirical studies are set up in a way in which it is impossible to formulate the rules 
equivalently. Thus, there are no quick fixes to rerun previous studies with slightly 
changed wordings. We have therefore constructed new scenarios (see Experiment 2 and 
3) in which equivalent rules and equivalent transgressions are applied (see below). As can 
be seen, (i) rules and transgressions are phrased using the same notions, (ii) action rules 
are negations of omission rules, and (iii) transgressions of omission rules are negations 
of action rules. 
 Rule Transgression of Rule 
Experiment 2 Action Don’t log in Alice logs in. 
Omission Log in Alice does not log in. 
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Experiment 3 Action Don’t click on that button Peter clicks on the button. 
Omission Click on that button Peter does not click on that button. 
 
Even if norms are made explicit and are formulated as opposites of each other, there is no 
guarantee that those norms will be of equal strength. It might still be the case that e.g. a 
norm that requires a person to log in will be perceived as less important than a norm 
requiring a person not to log in. Thus, to ensure that the omission norm is indeed 
equivalent to the action norm, pretests need to be run in order to examine how important 
or how strong a rule is conceived to be. However, we believe that both principles are not 
only necessary conditions for investigating the omission effect, applying those principles 
raises the likelihood that both norms will be equivalent in strength.5 
Previous studies have uncovered fascinating properties in people’s reasoning processes 
about actions and omissions. However, those studies (Cushman and Young, 2011; Ritov 
and Baron, 1999; Spranca et al., 1991) have described moral situations that use 
incommensurable rules, either because the wording is clearly not equivalent, or because 
the rules fail to be explicit and hence invite unwanted influences from people’s 
preconceptions about the legal system they live in. These studies have therefore not 
shown that the omission effect is a global phenomenon that is rooted in the ontological 
status of actions and omissions. In order to investigate a possible difference in 
blameworthiness between actions and omission, we need to present people with scenarios 
in which equivalent rules are applied. 
                                                 
5 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for very helpful advice on this matter. 
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1.4 Outline of Paper 
In this paper we present four experiments. We have argued that the omission effect other 
researchers have found might be an artefact of the methodology they used, most 
importantly, having failed to control for equally strong norms that get violated in the 
action and omission condition. In Experiment 1, we show that in the vignettes from 
Spranca et al. (1991) and Cushman et al. (2012), subjects indeed perceive the norms to 
be of different strength. Correcting for these methodological issues, Experiment 2 and 3 
use scenarios with explicit and equally strong rules for actions and omissions. While we 
deliberately excluded any indication of malicious intent and foreseeability in Experiment 
2, we added these factors in Experiment 3 to directly test the plausibility of both the 
Causal Relevance Hypothesis and the Overgeneralization Hypothesis. The data obtained 
from these experiments shows that the omission effect is not a universal effect that occurs 
in all circumstances. Instead, actions and omissions are basically considered equivalent 
in terms of their moral status, though these judgments get distorted in more complex 
scenarios. Experiment 4 tests a possible objection against the studies we conducted, 
namely, that once explicit rules are introduced, omissions are not merely perceived as 
omissions but as rule-violating actions. Finally, we discuss various ramifications for the 
interplay between our understanding of omissions and the legal system in which certain 
actions and omissions need to be punished. 
2 Experiment 1 
We have argued above that the differences in people’s blame attributions for actions and 
omissions that other researchers have found in their studies, does not necessarily reveal 
an omission effect. Instead these differences might be accounted for by the use of 
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scenarios in which the strength of the violated rule differed between the action and the 
omission condition. This seems to be a reasonable possibility because rules were not 
stated explicitly and a fortiori not formulated as opposites of each other. In order to 
substantiate our objection against previously conducted studies, we tested whether 
participants rated the importance of the norm in the action scenarios higher than the norm 
in omission scenarios.  
2.1 Methods 
216 participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid a small fee for 
taking the survey. 15 participants were excluded for either not finishing the survey or not 
indicating English as their native language.  
We selected two scenarios used in previous studies on the omission effect. While we do 
not claim that they are representative for all omission studies in the literature, both of 
them have received considerable attention and have often been discussed in other people’s 
work. We will refer to Spranca et al.’s (1991) study mentioned above simply as Ivan 
Lendl. We also selected a study by Cushman et al. (2012) which we call the Rock. 127 
participants were presented with the Ivan Lendl case and 74 participants were presented 
with the Rock case. They were then randomly assigned to the action or the omission 
condition. The vignettes were slightly shortened versions of the original scenarios and are 
depicted below. 
 (I) Action (II) Omission 
(a) Ivan Lendl John und Ivan are the finalists of a tennis tournament. The day before the 
final they have dinner together. John rememdabers that Ivan is allergic to 
Cayenne pepper and that eating Cayenne pepper gives him a severe 
stomachache. He also remembers that the house dressing contains Cayenne 
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pepper. He thinks to himself: "If Ivan eats the house dressing he will 
probably get a stomachache. Then I’ll have a chance to win.” 
At the restaurant, Ivan orders first. 
Before Ivan makes his choice, John 
recommends the house dressing to 
Ivan. When the waiter asks Ivan 
whether he prefers the house 
dressing or the Italian dressing, Ivan 
orders the house dressing. Ivan has 
no idea it contains Cayenne pepper.  
At the restaurant, Ivan orders first. 
When the waiter asks Ivan whether 
he prefers the house dressing or the 
Italian dressing, Ivan orders the 
house dressing. Ivan has no idea it 
contains Cayenne pepper. John says 
nothing and realizes that had he told 
Ivan about the Cayenne pepper, he 
would have ordered the Italian 
dressing. 
Ivan gets a severe stomachache that keeps him up all night. John wins the 
match. 
(b) Rock Ed is driving ﬁve sick people to the hospital with a cord hanging out the side 
of his car.  
He approaches a rock climber resting 
by the side of the road. If he does not 
slow down, the climber will be 
knocked off the road by the cord and 
fall down a steep cliff. If he does 
slow down, the ﬁve sick people will 
die before they reach the hospital. Ed 
keeps driving quickly and knocks the 
rock climber off the side of the road. 
He approaches a rock climber who is 
about to fall off the side of the road 
and down a steep cliff. If he slows 
down, the rock climber can use the 
cord to prevent himself from falling, 
but the ﬁve sick people will die 
before they reach the hospital. Ed 
keeps driving quickly and the 
climber falls off the side of the road. 
 
After reading one of the vignettes, people answered two questions:  
Rule: 
Please tell us which rule John / Ed violated. If more than one comes to mind, please tell 
us the most important one. 
Importance of Rule: 
Please think about the answer you just gave. How important do you believe this rule to 
be? 
Whereas participants used a textbox to type in their answers to question 1 (Rule), they 
evaluated the importance of the rule on a 15-point Likert scale anchored at ‘1’ meaning 
‘of little importance’ and ‘15’ meaning ‘of utmost importance’. 
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2.2 Results 
In the Ivan Lendl case, the average rating for the importance of the rule that John had 
violated was higher in the action condition (M = 12.87, SD 2.01) than in the omission 
condition (M = 11.15, SD = 4.34). A similar result was obtained in the Rock scenario: on 
average people rated the importance of the rule that Ed broke in the action condition (M 
= 11.20, SD = 3.51) to be higher compared to the omission condition (M = 8.35, SD = 
4.55). For both cases we performed a t-test: In both the Ivan Lendl as well as the Rock 
case, the difference between the means was significant: t(72) = 3.04, p = 0.003, one-tailed 
& t(125) = 2.92, p=0.004, one-tailed. The average ratings for both the Ivan Lendl as well 
as the Rock scenarios can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Mean ratings of the importance of norms in actions and omission scenarios. Participants evaluated the 
norms on a 15-point Likert scale with ‘1’ meaning ‘of little importance’ and ‘15’ meaning ‘of utmost importance’. 
Bars indicate the standard error around the mean. 
2.3 Discussion 
We have argued above that in order to investigate possible differences in people’s 
evaluations of agent’s omissive and commissive behavior, we should make sure that the 
norms that get violated are equally strong. In both cases that we selected from the 
literature, (i) the rules were not made explicit, and (ii) the rules were not formulated as 
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opposites of each other. It is therefore quite likely that the rules would not be considered 
equally strong. The results of Experiment 1 support this prediction. Participants rated the 
rules in the action scenarios to be significantly more important than the rules in the 
omission scenarios. Thus, the putative omission effect recorded by Spranca et al. (1991) 
as well as Cushman et al. (2012) can be reasonably accounted for by the fact that the norm 
in the omission scenarios was considered less important than the norm in the action 
condition. While it still might be true that omissions are perceived as less blameworthy 
compared to actions, no such conclusion can be drawn from their experiments. We also 
claimed that not making rules explicit would lead people to interpret the scenarios to be 
violations of different rules, the evaluations of which would then differ from one rule to 
the next. Participants indeed considered the scenarios to be violations of different norms, 
e.g., in the Ivan Lendl case, sportsmanship, cheating, poisoning, general ethical norm, 
and many other responses were given. For Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 we also tested 
whether the norms we introduced into the scenarios were indeed considered equally 
strong or not. The methods and the results of these studies can be found in the Appendix. 
3 Experiment 2 
We know from a plethora of studies (Alicke, 2008; Cushman, 2013; Knobe, 2003), that 
subjects hold others responsible as soon as they detect (1) deliberate intent to bring about 
a certain outcome, and / or (2) the violation of certain statistical or moral norms by the 
person’s behavior. In the second experiment, we were particularly interested in whether 
people show an omission effect when a norm violation was introduced. Several previous 
studies have already revealed differences in blame attribution between actions and 
omissions in cases of norm violations. The vignettes that were used in those studies were 
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often carefully controlled for factors such as intent and foreseeability. As we have argued 
in the Introduction and shown in Experiment 1, however, these studies have not also 
controlled for the equivalence of the norms. Instead, people were free to evaluate for 
themselves the kind and importance of the violated rule. Thus, we developed vignettes 
that introduced company policies that are explicated as opposites of each other in the 
action and the omission scenarios (see Methods below). In Appendix A we present the 
results of a preliminary study for Experiment 2, showing that the norms were indeed 
considered equally strong. Controlling for the equivalence of the norm violation allowed 
us to investigate the origin of the omission effect in greater detail. If an omission effect 
can be found in such an experiment, then this result would be consistent with the 
overgeneralization account of Ritov and Baron (1999). In contrast, if no difference occurs, 
then this would be an important result that can be drawn upon to theorize on the origin of 
the omission effect. In in order to also test the Causal Relevance Hypothesis, we asked 
people to rate the causal status of the protagonist’s behavior. 
3.1 Method 
The scenarios we used in Experiment 2 are variations of vignettes from Reuter et al. 
(2015). A total of 247 participants were recruited for Experiment 2. We excluded 7 
participants for either not finishing the survey or for indicating that English was not their 
native language. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios 
depicted below: I(a), I(b), II(a), and II(b). 
 (I) Action (II) Omission 
 Alice works for a company. In order to make sure that Alice is available to 
answer incoming phone calls, the company issued the following policy:  
Alice is not permitted to log in to the 
central computer of the company 
until 1pm. Unbeknownst to 
Alice has to log in to the central 
computer of the company until 1pm. 
Unbeknownst to everybody, if she is 
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everybody, if she is logged in to the 
central computer at noon, 
not logged in to the central computer 
at noon, 
(a) Neutral outcome an empty email is immediately sent 
from the central computer to a non-
existent email address. 
One morning, violating the official 
policy, Alice logs in to the central 
computer.  
an empty email is immediately sent 
from the central computer to a non-
existent email address. 
One morning, violating the official 
policy, Alice does not log in to the 
central computer.  
At noon, an empty email is sent from the central computer to a non-existent 
email address. 
(b) Bad outcome some work emails containing important customer information are deleted 
from the central computer. 
One morning, violating the official 
policy, Alice logs in to the central 
computer.  
One morning, violating the official 
policy, Alice does not log in to the 
central computer.  
At noon, some work emails containing important customer information are 
deleted from the central computer. 
 
119 participants were then presented with the following question:  
Blame Question:  
How would you evaluate Alice's logging / not logging in to the computer, on a scale 
from '1' to '7', where '1' means 'Very blameworthy', '4' means 'Neither blameworthy nor 
praiseworthy' and '7' means 'Very praiseworthy'? 
 
The other 121 participants were asked to assess the causal status of the protagonist: 
Cause Question: 
How much do you agree with the following statement: Alice caused  
(a) an empty email to be sent from the central computer to a non-existent email 
address? 
(b) some work emails containing important customer information to be deleted from the 
central computer? 
Participants rated the causal status of the action or omission by indicating their agreement 
on a 7-point Likert scale, anchored at ‘1’ meaning ‘not at all’ and ‘7’ meaning ‘fully’. 
3.2 Results 
Figure 2 below depicts the average values of all four conditions for which people rated 
the blameworthiness of Alice’s behavior. In all conditions the average ratings were highly 
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similar. Neutral Outcome: Action (M = 2.34, SD = 0.94), Omission (M = 2.25, SD = 
1.03), Bad Outcome: Action (M = 2.30, SD = 1.29), Omission (M = 2.38, SD = 0.88). 
These results confirm previous studies that show that the violation of a norm is a stronger 
trigger for attributing blame than the moral status of the outcome (Reuter et al., 2014). A 
2 x 2 ANOVA with Action and Outcome as independent factors, and participant’s rating 
as dependent measure was carried out. The data exhibited no significant main effect either 
for Action, F(1,115) = 0.00, p < 0.969, nor for Outcome, F(1,115) = 0.04, p = 0.842. Also, 
no interaction was found, F(1,115) = 0.20, p = 0.657.  
 
Figure 2: Average ratings for actions and omissions when the outcome was either neutral or bad on a 7-point Likert 
scale, where '1' means 'Very blameworthy', '4' means 'Neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy' and '7' means 'Very 
praiseworthy'. Bars indicate the standard error around the mean. 
We also evaluated the mean values for the causal ratings. Neutral Outcome: Action (M = 
6.08, SD = 1.35), Omission (M = 5.62, SD = 1.71), Bad Outcome: Action (M = 5.94, SD 
= 1.37), Omission (M = 5.31, SD = 1.72), (see also Figure 3). A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed 
a marginally significant main effect for Action, F(1,117) = 3.55, p = 0.062, but no 
significant effect for Outcome, F(1,117) = 0.63, p = 0.429. No interaction was found, 
(F1,117) = 0.09, p = 0.763. 
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Figure 3: Mean values for causal ratings comparing actions with omissions when (1) a neutral outcome occurred, 
and (2) when a bad outcome happened. Participants rated the causal status by indicating their agreement on a 7-
point Likert scale, anchored at ‘1’ meaning ‘not at all’ and ‘7’ meaning ‘fully’. Bars indicate the standard error 
around the mean. 
3.3 Discussion 
For the neutral and the bad outcome scenarios, participants judged the rule-violating 
omission to be just as blameworthy as the rule-violating action. While a negative result 
cannot be taken as evidence that no omission effect exists, our data raises serious concerns 
about the conclusions other people have drawn from their experiments. For in those 
experiments a crucial factor – rule equivalence – was not kept constant when comparing 
actions with omissions. If, as we suggest and the data indicates, actions and omissions are 
judged to be equally blameworthy when rules are held constant, pace Cushman et al. 
(2012) and others, then further theoretical and empirical investigations are needed to find 
out which factors drive the differences in people’s moral judgments in those scenarios. 
Our results are particularly interesting for assessing the plausibility of the 
Overgeneralization Hypothesis. If people show an omission effect because they 
overgeneralize from scenarios in which it is reasonable to prefer omission to actions, why 
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do they fail to overgeneralize in those scenarios that we presented in Experiment 2? Do 
people only overgeneralize if malicious intent is in play, or does the asymmetry of codes 
of law (focusing on actions rather than omissions) provide a better account of our results? 
These questions will be treated in more detail both in Experiment 3 and the General 
Discussion. 
To test the relation between people’s causal and moral judgements for actions and 
omissions, we also asked subjects to judge the causal impact of actions and omissions for 
a neutral and bad outcome (see Figure 3). Here, we found a marginally significant 
difference between actions and omissions. Spranca et al. (1991) provide data that suggests 
that the difference in the perceived causal status of actions and omissions may be a 
possible factor that triggers the omission effect. While we lack strong evidence to rule out 
this explanation, the results of our studies also put the Causal Relevance Hypothesis into 
doubt: Different attributions of causal efficacy did not seem to have any effect on the 
attributions of blame.  
No omission effect was found in Experiment 2. However, previous studies that found an 
omission effect included malicious intent. But what is the role of malicious intent in 
regards to the omission effect? Is it a sufficient condition for triggering an omission 
effect? The following two hypotheses sketch these possibilities:  
1. The omission effect depends on the agent’s foreseeability of the outcome and/or 
the intention to cause harm. Once these factors are present, many participants will 
prefer omissions to actions. 
2. The omission effect disappears if the equivalence of the violated rule is properly 
controlled for. Thus, even in cases in which a bad outcome is foreseen or intended, 
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people will judge omissions just as harshly as actions if an equivalent rule 
violation is perceived. Foreseeability and malicious intent are not sufficient. 
Both hypotheses share the assumption that foreseeability and malicious intent may be 
critical to trigger an omission effect. However, only the first prediction considers these 
factors to be sufficient conditions for the omission effect to occur. In those cases, in which 
an equivalent rule is applied to both actions and omissions, the omission effect is 
eliminated. Experiment 3 was particularly designed to test the predictions of those 
hypotheses. 
4 Experiment 3 
In Experiment 2, we did not find any omission effect, despite the fact that blame ratings 
were quite strong. We argued (see Discussion 3.3. above) that the lack of an omission 
effect can be plausibly explained by the equivalence of the violated rule in the action and 
omission case. In Experiment 3, we directly test the impact of equivalent rules. To do so, 
we developed two new pairs of scenarios. The first pair structurally matches other studies 
in which an omission effect has been observed. In these scenarios, Peter is aware that a 
certain outcome is likely to follow from his action or omission. He can therefore be 
charged with recklessness and malicious intent. According to previous studies, we expect 
that blame ratings in response to these scenarios will not only show fairly high blame 
ratings, but, importantly, will reveal an omission effect. The second pair of scenarios is 
almost identical with the first pair with one crucial difference. Similarly to Experiment 2, 
we introduced a company policy that highlights the danger of either committing or 
omitting a certain action and prohibits the corresponding action or omission. If our 
hypothesis (2) – that equivalent rule violations can annihilate the omission effect – is 
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correct, we would expect roughly equal blame ratings for the second pair of scenarios in 
which the company policy was introduced. 
4.1 Method 
116 participants were recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Each participant was 
presented with a single question about the praise- or blameworthiness of Peter’s 
behaviour. We also presented 123 participants with the same scenarios and asked them 
how much they agreed with the claim that Peter caused the outcome.6 All participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the following four scenarios: 
 (I) Action (II) Omission 
(a) No Rule Violation Peter works for a sales company. Among other things, he is responsible 
for several tasks like answering incoming phone calls, updating customer 
information on the central computer, etc. 
One morning, Peter goes through his normal routine and updates 
customer information on the central computer, when suddenly a window 
pops up.  
Peter reads the text which states: 
"All customer information will be 
deleted. If you like to continue, 
click on 'delete'." 
Peter clicks on 'delete'. 
Immediately,  
Peter reads the text which states: 
"In 30 seconds, all customer 
information will be deleted. If you 
like to abort, click on 'cancel'." 
Peter does not click on 'cancel'. 
After 30 seconds,  
all customer information is deleted from the central computer. The 
company loses important information of customers. 
(b) Rule Violation Peter works for a sales company. Among other things, he is responsible 
for several tasks like answering incoming phone calls, updating customer 
information on the central computer, etc. 
For some unknown reason, the central computer is currently 
malfunctioning. Every now and then, when someone updates customer 
information, a window pops up, stating: 
"All customer information will be 
deleted. If you like to continue, 
click on 'delete'." In order to avoid 
customer information to be 
deleted, the company issued the 
"In 30 seconds, all customer 
information will be deleted. If you 
like to abort, click on 'cancel'." In 
order to avoid customer 
information to be deleted, the 
                                                 
6 11 subjects had to be excluded from the data because they either did not complete the survey or were non-
native English speakers. 
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following policy: When this 
window pops up, do not click on 
'delete'. 
 
company issued the following 
policy: When this window pops up, 
click on 'cancel'. 
One morning, Peter goes through his normal routine and updates 
customer information on the central computer, when suddenly a window 
pops up. Peter reads the text which states: 
"All customer information will be 
deleted. If you like to continue, 
click on 'delete'." 
Violating the official policy, Peter 
clicks on 'delete'. Immediately, 
"In 30 seconds, all customer 
information will be deleted. If you 
like to abort, click on 'cancel'." 
Violating the official policy, Peter 
does not click on 'cancel'. After 30 
seconds, 
all customer information is deleted from the central computer. The 
company loses important information of customers. 
 
We also examined whether people considered the norms in the action and omission 
scenarios to be equivalent for the no-rule violation and rule violation condition. The 
results are presented in Appendix B and show that whereas the norms were rated to be of 
different strength in the no-rule violation cases, there was no significant difference in the 
ratings for the rule violation cases. 
4.2 Results 
In the ‘No Violation’ scenarios, the average rating for the Action condition (M = 1.48, 
SD = 0.83) was substantially lower than for the Omission condition (M = 2.48, SD = 
1.73). In contrast, in the Rule Violation scenarios, average values were M = 1.71 (SD = 
0.97, Action) and M = 1.82 (SD = 0.73, Omission). Figure 4 below depicts the mean 
blame ratings for each of the four conditions. A 2 x 2 ANOVA with Action and Rule 
Violation as independent factors, and participant's rating as dependent measure was 
carried out. The data exhibit a significant main effect for Action, F(1, 112) = 6.48; p = 
0.012, but not for Rule Violation, F (1, 112) = 1.02; p = 0.314. Importantly, a significant 
interaction occurred between Action and Rule Violation, F(1, 112) = 4.13, p < 0.045. 
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Figure 4: Impact of rule violation on blame ratings for actions and omissions when the outcome was foreseen. 
Ratings were anchored at '1' = 'Very blameworthy', '4' = 'Neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy' and '7' = 'Very 
praiseworthy'. Bars indicate the standard error around the mean. 
In both types of scenarios, the causal ratings differed between the action and omission 
conditions: No Violation: Action (M = 6.45, SD = 0.85), Omission (M = 4.97, SD = 1.77), 
Rule Violation: Action (M = 6.35, SD = 1.05), Omission (M = 5.65, SD = 1.52). We 
applied a 2 x 2 ANOVA for people’s responses to the causal question. We found a highly 
significant main effect for Action, F(1,119) = 20.51, p < 0.001, but none for Rule 
Violation, F(1,119) = 1.44, p = 0.232, or any significant interaction F(1,119) = 2.56, p = 
0.112. 
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Figure 5: Mean values for causal ratings comparing actions with omissions when (1) no rule was violated, and (2) 
when a rule was violated. Participants rated the causal status by indicating their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale, 
anchored at ‘1’ meaning ‘not at all’ and ‘7’ meaning ‘fully’. Bars indicate the standard error around the mean.Bars 
indicate the standard error around the mean. 
4.2 Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate a specific hypothesis about people’s moral 
judgements about omissions and actions. Based on our results from Experiment 2, we 
speculated that the omission effect might not be a universal effect that holds more 
generally, but instead manifests itself only in situations in which the equivalence of 
violated rules is not guaranteed. Once equivalent rules or policies are introduced that 
prohibit actions or omissions equally, the omission effect is likely not to occur. The results 
of Experiment 3 provide strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In the No Rule 
violation scenarios, we found a relatively strong omission effect, despite the fact that both 
action and omission (a) lead to the same outcome, and (b) were done with arguably the 
same degree of foreseeability and intent. However, in the rule violation case, no omission 
effect could be found. The significant interaction between Action/Omission and Rule 
 - 25 - 
 
Violation demonstrates that people judge the moral valence of Peter’s behavior differently 
in both pairs of scenarios. 
The average causal ratings (see Figure 5) provide further evidence against the idea that 
the omission effect is largely driven by the perceived causal status of actions vs. 
omissions. While the average value for omissions in the rule violation case was larger 
(5.65) compared to the scenario in which no rule violation was observed (4.97), there was 
nonetheless a strong significant difference between the causal ratings for actions and 
omissions in the rule violation scenario. 
5 Experiment 4 
In introducing explicit rules in Experiment 2 and 3, our approach raises an interesting 
objection: When a person’s omission leads to a negative outcome, having violated a rule, 
then that person has not only omitted an action that would have prevented the negative 
outcome, she has also committed an action, namely that of violating a rule. In cases in 
which an explicit rule is violated, people may perceive a person’s behavior not merely as 
an omission to log in, but also as a violation of the rule that tells her to log in, and therefore 
an action. Thus, so the objection, we have not shown that under certain conditions, 
omissions are treated in the same way as actions, but we have only shown that rule 
violations are (at least sometimes) treated equivalently regardless of whether they were 
triggered by omissions or by actions.  
This objection, however, can be empirically investigated. If the participants in our study 
considered the omission in the rule-violation condition to also be an action, then they will 
be more inclined to describe the protagonist’s omission to prevent a bad outcome as an 
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instance of doing harm compared to allowing harm.7 We tested this prediction by 
presenting a new group of participants with the same four vignettes that we used in 
Experiment 3, and asking them to categorize the agent’s behavior as either doing harm or 
allowing harm8. 
5.1 Method 
125 participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and paid a compensation 
for taking the survey. Three participants were excluded for not completing the survey. 
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four vignettes used in Experiment 
3. After reading the scenario we presented them with the following question: 
Which of the two statements do you believe best describes the situation? 
1. Peter allowed the data to be deleted. 
2. Peter deleted the data. 
5.2 Results 
Whereas no differences in the percentages of the responses were found for both action 
conditions (63.7% deleting vs. 36.7% allowing), a minor difference was recorded in the 
omission conditions: in the no rule violation scenario, 3.2% of the participants classified 
the situation as a case of ‘deleting the data’, 12.9% of the participants rated the rule-
violation case as a matter of ‘deleting the data’. The percentages for all four conditions 
are shown in Figure 6. A logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of Rule 
Violation (whether a rule was violated or not) as well as Action (whether Peter performed 
an action or an omission) on people’s categorization as doing or allowing. While Action 
                                                 
7 We would like to thank a reviewer for this journal for making this suggestion. 
8 We used a similar approach as Cushman et al. (2008) and Phillips et al. (2015). In order to examine 
whether participants judged the protagonist’s behaviour as an instance of doing harm or allowing harm, 
Cushman et al. asked whether it was more appropriate to say that the agent made the fetus die, or allowed 
the fetus to die (2008, 286). Phillips et al. use a similar phrasing and asked whether Dr. Bennet ended the 
man’s life or allowed it to end.  
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was a significant predictor for people’s responses (B(1) = 2.995, p < 0.001), Rule was not 
significant (B1 = 0.325, p = 0.487). 
 
Figure 6: Figure 6: Percentage of responses for ‘deleted the data’ and ‘allowed the data to be deleted’ in action and 
omission scenarios in which the rule was either violated or was not violated. 
5.3 Discussion 
Based on the results of Experiment 4 we are confident to reject the objection that 
introducing rules changes people’s understanding of the agent’s behavior. In the no rule 
violation condition, the vast majority of the participants describe Peter’s omissive 
behavior as an instance of allowing harm to occur, while Peter’s comissive behavior was 
perceived by a considerable majority to be a case of doing harm. Importantly, the results 
demonstrate that the categorization of Peter’s behavior does not change significantly 
when a rule is introduced. 
6 General Discussion 
Several authors have argued that their studies provide empirical evidence that people 
judge omissions to be less blameworthy than actions even if those omissions lead to the 
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same negative outcome. The results of our experiments presented in this paper challenge 
the generality and pervasiveness of that claim and allow us to sketch a more specific 
theory on people’s reasoning about actions and omissions.  
We started out by identifying an important methodological problem in previously 
conducted experiments on the omission effect. While many researchers carefully 
controlled for the equivalence of intent and outcome, they failed to ensure that 
participants interpreted the scenarios such that a difference between actions and omission 
can only be accounted for by a difference in the ontological status of actions and 
omissions. Previous studies did not control for what rule people believe to be violated in 
the action and omission cases, and also how important these rule are considered to be. In 
Experiment 1, we confirmed these predictions empirically by testing the strength of 
norms for two examples from the literature in which the omission effect has been argued 
to emerge. In both cases, the importance of the norm in the action case was rated higher 
than in the omission case. These differences can account for why subjects also attribute 
greater amounts of blame to actions compared to omissions.  
We therefore decided to create scenarios that introduce rules that are equivalent for 
actions and omissions. If people indeed have a pervasive bias against actions and favor 
omissions, then we would expect omissions to be treated less harshly than actions even if 
an equivalent rule was violated. However, our results demonstrate that equivalent rules 
seem to prevent an omission effect from happening when the outcome was unbeknownst 
to the agent (Experiment 2), and eliminate differences in people’s thinking between 
actions and omissions when the outcome was actually foreseen and intended (Experiment 
3). The ontological and causal differences between actions and omissions do not seem to 
be sufficient to trigger an omission effect when the norms that get violated by actions and 
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omissions are made explicit. The results of Experiment 4 demonstrate that even when 
explicit rules are introduced, people continue to classify them as instances of allowing a 
certain outcome to happen. If our data is robust and our methodology sound, then the 
outcome of our study not only questions whether a ‘pure’ omission effect exists, but also 
raises challenges for previous explanatory accounts of the omission effect. 
Let us therefore, in light of our new findings, assess the two explanatory accounts of the 
omission effect that have been put forward in the literature. The Causal Relevance 
Hypothesis postulated by Spranca et al. (1991) and Cushman et al. (2012) claims that 
differences in blame attribution can be accounted for by differences in the perceived 
causal status of omissions and actions. This hypothesis would be consistent with our result 
that people attribute the same amount of blame to actions and omissions when a 
symmetric rule is violated, only if people do not perceive a difference in the causal 
efficacy of actions and omissions. However, both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 
indicate that people continue to ascribe greater causal power to actions. It remains open 
for advocates of the Causal Relevance Hypothesis to categorize our scenarios as special 
cases in which a difference in the perceived causal status does not need to lead to an 
omission effect. But surely the burden of proof is on them to argue for that point. 
In contrast, the Overgeneralization Hypothesis does not locate the origin of the omission 
effect in perceived causal differences, but rather explains the omission effect through the 
overgeneralization from the many cases in which omissions are clearly less blameworthy 
than actions. Thus, favoring omissions that lead to a bad outcome may not be 
independently justifiable in all cases, but as part of a fast and frugal heuristic, it seems to 
be a reasonable stance. We are generally sympathetic to this position and believe it 
provides a good first approximation to explain various occurrences of heightened blame 
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attributions for actions compared to omissions. However, the results of our studies allow 
us to refine this position and to speculate about the source of the overgeneralization 
heuristic. Our results demonstrate that people do not seem to overgeneralize to all 
situations in which the moral status of actions and omissions is at stake. More specifically, 
when equivalent rules with equal strength prohibit certain actions and omissions, people 
are not willing to overgeneralize and hence do not favor omissions that lead to the same 
bad outcome. Thus, the proclaimed heuristic has clear limits. But why should people feel 
inclined to favor omissions in cases in which malicious intent and outcome are held 
constant but in which equivalent rules were not explicitly established?  
A plausible answer to this question identifies the source of the overgeneralization 
heuristic within the asymmetrical treatment of actions and omissions in legal systems. 
Arguably, most codes of law share an emphasis on the prohibitions of actions, but remain 
silent on the prohibition of omissions. In American criminal law, omissions or failures to 
act usually become punishable only if specific duties or responsibilities have been 
previously established (Robinson, 2005).9 It should not surprise therefore that individuals 
who grow up in societies that stress the prohibition of harmful actions and (for whatever 
reasons) disregard equally harmful omissions, will develop a positive bias towards 
omissions. In other words, the way most current legal systems operate, is likely to distort 
people’s reasoning about actions and omissions. 
This explanation can account for people’s tendency to overgeneralize in some cases and 
why they do not overgeneralize in others. In situations in which intentions and 
foreseeability are equal between actions and omissions and no norms are made explicit, 
                                                 
9 Examples include the duty to care for one’s children or other dependents, and duties arising due to one’s 
profession (medical personnel, policemen etc.).  
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people are likely to rely on more general moral norms and have little reason to actively 
suppress their bias – courts will still punish those omissions less harshly. However, in 
circumstances, in which the norm-violating nature of omissions is made salient, this bias 
is blocked: With explicit rules come clearly defined punishments; and equivalent rules 
mean – ceteris paribus – equivalent punishment. Consequently, previous experiments that 
reveal greater blame ratings for common kinds of bad actions do not provide independent 
evidence that omissions qua omissions are less blameworthy. 
If our suggestion is correct, people who live in countries that harbor stronger penalties for 
omissions, will display weaker omission effects. There is, indeed, some evidence 
supporting this conjecture. Abarbanell and Hauser (2010) report that small-scale, agrarian 
Mayan populations do not show an omission effect when being presented with the same 
type of vignettes that lead to strong omission effects in Western cultures. They observe 
that those Mayan populations emphasize mutual obligations and responsibilities in order 
to guarantee well-being within the community. This in turn provides a fascinating 
explanation for the absence of an omission effect: “the highly intertwined nature of social 
relationships and their associated obligations may have reduced the perceived moral 
distinction between actions and omissions.“ (2010, p.220) While this study provides some 
initial support for our claim, further cross-cultural studies are needed to shed more light 
on this hypothesis. Another way to examine the relationship between people’s moral 
evaluation of actions and omissions on the one hand, and their legal status on the other 
hand, is to test children’s sensitivity to the omission effect. Arguably, young children 
have not yet been strongly exposed to the legal system they live in and, hence, provide 
unbiased test subjects.10 In fact, Powell et al. (2012) investigated whether 5-6 year-old 
                                                 
10 This objection has been raised by an anonymous reviewer for this journal. 
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children as well as 7-8 year-old children show an omission effect. In a forced-choice 
paradigm, directly comparing actions with omissions, both groups of children judge 
actions to be worse than omission when the same outcome occurred, raising doubts about 
the theoretical interpretation we have advanced in the last paragraphs. However, two 
things should be taken into consideration: (i) when children rated the actions and 
omissions independently of each other, no omission effect was found in children 
compared to adults. (ii) it is quite likely that even 5-6 year-old children have been 
sufficiently exposed to the legal system they live in – not, of course, in a direct manner, 
but more indirectly via the education from their parents. 
Finally, we would like to suggest some avenues for future research. First, while our results 
already indicate a relationship between moral intuitions and the legal system, we do not 
have conclusive evidence as to what influences what. To directly test whether the legal 
system influences moral intuitions or vice versa, cross-cultural studies do provide a 
fruitful resource. If our hypothesis is correct and thus moral intuitions rely on the 
workings of the legal system, people in countries like Germany or France – in which 
omissions to help others in distress are subject to legal punishment – should show a 
smaller omission effect than, for instance, Americans. Second, it might be argued that the 
introduction of equivalent rules was not the only factor that was modified in our 
experiments. Not only did we introduce rules that were equivalent between actions and 
omissions, we also did so explicitly. Extant studies have mainly relied on very clear cases 
of moral transgressions that entailed physical harms like death or injury, or immoral 
actions like lying or betrayal. Arguably, researchers have not made explicit the rules that 
the protagonists violated because there simply is no need to explicitly mention that killing 
people is wrong. Thus, telling people that a certain behavior violated a norm may well 
 - 33 - 
 
impact on their moral judgments, even though they already know that the respective 
behavior is wrong. We attempt to empirically test this alternative explanation in follow-
up studies. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we examined how various factors influence our moral and causal judgments 
about actions and omissions. We have provided new experimental data challenging 
previous studies on the omission effect, both methodologically and philosophically. We 
have empirically demonstrated that people do not consider actions more blameworthy 
than omissions if an equivalent rule is introduced. In cases in which actions and omissions 
violate an equivalent rule, the omission effect disappears. In addition, we outlined 
promising research opportunities to investigate the role of the legal system for people’s 
evaluation of omissions. While many researchers have claimed that the legal system is 
influenced by the omission effect, our results indicate a rather opposite direction of 
influence. 
Appendix 
Appendix A: Preliminary Study for Experiment 2. 
In order to ensure that the rules in the scenarios listed below were indeed equivalent, we 
conducted a preliminary test in which we asked 106 people to rate the importance of the 
rule for the bad outcome scenarios. This was done in a structurally identical manner as in 
Experiment 1. People were randomly assigned to either the omission condition or the 
action condition and rated the importance of the rule on a 15-point Likert scale between 
‘1’ meaning ‘of little importance’ and ‘15’ meaning ‘of utmost importance’. The 
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preliminary test revealed that ratings on the importance of the rule were not significantly 
different between the action condition (M = 12.63, SD = 2.39) and the omission condition 
(M = 13.06, SD = 2.55): t(104) = 0.887, p = 0.377. 
Appendix B: Preliminary Study for Experiment 3. 
138 participants were randomly assigned to any of the four scenarios of Experiment 3. 
The preliminary test on the strength of the norm demonstrated that while in the No Rule 
scenarios the norms were rated substantially higher in the action condition (M = 12.72, 
SD = 2.77) than in the omission condition (M = 10.87, SD = 3.99), in the Rule violation 
scenarios, norms were rated only marginally more important in the action condition (M 
= 13.14, SD = 2.83) compared to the omission condition (M = 12.75, SD = 3.35). We 
conducted a 2 X 2 ANOVA yielding both significant main effects for Action/Omission 
(F(1,134) = 4.08, p = 0.045) and No Rule/Rule (F(1,134) = 4.29, p = 0.040) but no 
significant interaction F(1,134) = 1.74, p = 0.190. 
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